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. Introduction
Within constitutional limits, Congress may create administrative agencies
with adjudicatory power.' Congress may also define the jurisdiction of Article
III courts.2 As a result, Congress has the greatest control over the balance of
power between courts and agencies. It can provide exclusive jurisdiction over a
matter to one tribunal, or provide concurrent jurisdiction to both. Neither
courts nor agencies can disregard these statutory boundaries.3 In reality,
however, the balance of power is more complicated. Courts and agencies may
willingly relinquish adjudicatory power that is rightfully theirs in favor of the
other.4
When a court wishes to defer to the adjudicatory authority of an agency,
there are a number of legal means available, including finality, ripeness, and
exhaustion. A related but less popular means of deference is the primary
jurisdiction doctrine. Because it is applied infrequently, the shape of this
doctrine is not fully defined. The circuit courts employ differing conceptions of
primary jurisdiction,5 utilize different factors in their analysis, 6 and apply
7different standards of review.
1. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (holding that Congress may delegate
fact finding authority to agencies rather than courts); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods.
Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) ("[Tlhe Court has long recognized that Congress is not barred
from acting pursuant to its powers under Article I to vest decisionmaking authority in tribunals
that lack the attributes of Article III courts."); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854 (1986)
(holding that vesting the petitioner with jurisdiction over a narrow set of common-law claims
does not threaten the separation of powers).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (granting Congress the power to "ordain and establish"
inferior courts); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441,449 (1850) ("Courts created by statute can have
no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers."); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 513 (1868)
(noting that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is subject to the exceptions and
regulations of Congress).
3. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,404(1821) ("We have no more right
to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.").
4. See JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 49.01 (2006) (noting that courts
have discretion to apply the exhaustion doctrine and refer the case to the agency and noting that
agencies may waive their jurisdiction to invoke the power of the courts to enforce administrative
rulings or orders).
5. See infra Part II.B (comparing the Tenth Circuit's description of the doctrine with that
of the Seventh Circuit).
6. See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (discussing the factors used by the
various circuit courts).
7. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735,750 (10th
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Standard of review disputes, unfortunately, are particularly difficult to
resolve. Without a statutory mandate, or a clear history of appellate practice,
there is little to turn to for guidance.8 Judges are often of little help,
expressing the standard of review in a few words before addressing the
merits. For the attorney contemplating an appeal, however, knowing the
applicable standard is crucial. 9 First, the standard of review affects the
decision whether to appeal because the likelihood of success is a function of
"the nature of the error claimed and the standard under which it is
reviewed." 10 Second, the review standard focuses and organizes arguments,
and it provides "a shared language of appellate scope.""
The standard of review for primary jurisdiction in particular presents a
valuable opportunity for litigants. A few circuits have yet to address the
problem, 12 while others have explicitly left the issue to be decided another
day. 13 In these circuits there is law to be made, and litigants may persuade
the court to adopt a standard advantageous to their position.
This Note addresses the issue of the proper standard of appellate review
for primary jurisdiction decisions and concludes that they should be reviewed
only for an abuse of discretion. 14 In reaching this conclusion, Part II begins
with a summary of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, including the
development and application of the doctrine, as well as a breakdown of the
current circuit split. Part III examines the two applicable review standards,
namely, de novo and abuse of discretion. Part IV then analyzes the
application of the doctrine and determines that primary jurisdiction decisions
are best characterized as discretionary, as opposed to factual or legal. Lastly,
Part V discusses analogous doctrines, which reinforce the validity of the
abuse of discretion standard.
Cir. 2005) (acknowledging the circuit split over the standard of review applied to primary
jurisdiction decisions).
8. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (finding that, without statutory
guidance or historical practices, deriving the correct standard of review is "uncommonly
difficult").
9. See FED. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(B) (mandating that the appellant's brief include for each
issue "a concise statement of the applicable standard of review").
10. JAMES WM. MOORE ETAL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 206.01 (3d ed. 2006).
11. STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 1.02
(3d ed. 1999).
12. See infra Part II.C (pointing out that the standard of review is unclear in the First,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits).
13. See infra Part II.C.1 (noting that the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have postponed
addressing this issue).
14. See infra Part VI (concluding that review for an abuse of discretion fits the doctrine
best).
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II. The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine
In appropriate circumstances, the primary jurisdiction doctrine provides
trial courts a useful tool for advancing certain policy objectives by deferring
to the decisionmaking power of administrative tribunals.' 5 Specifically, it
aims to promote better informed legal decisions by proper utilization of
administrative expertise, and it seeks to maintain uniform treatment of a
regulatory scheme by leaving critical decisions to the appropriate agency.16
When these objectives will be furthered by its application, the doctrine allows
a court to refer issues to an agency that, because of a congressional delegation
of power, has special knowledge and discretion over the subject matter.
17
The doctrine arises from a series of Supreme Court cases addressing the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and its regulation of common
carriers.' 8 In these cases, the Court invoked the primary jurisdiction of the
ICC in order to give effect to the congressional intent of the Commerce Act.19
The application of the doctrine was tantamount to a finding of exclusive
original jurisdiction in the agency.20 As such, the doctrine probably would
have been more aptly entitled the exclusive primary jurisdiction doctrine.
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, the doctrine shifted from
its original conception. 1 The primary jurisdiction analysis transformed from
an entirely jurisdictional inquiry to a predominantly prudential one. By
taking on a permissive quality, the doctrine now encompasses contextual
15. See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 1244
(10th ed. 2003) ("[T]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction is more accurately described as a set of
policy considerations, applied in [a] fact-specific manner, than as a collection of formulaic
rules.").
16. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 672 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (noting the benefits of primary jurisdiction).
17. See Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952) ("[I]n cases raising
issues of fact not within the conventional experience ofjudges or cases requiring the exercise of
administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress... should not be passed over.").
18. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 430 (1907)
(addressing an oil company's claim that it was charged an unreasonable rate for interstate
shipping).
19. See id. at 440-41 (reviewing the Commerce Act to determine whether judicial review
of shipping rates was consistent with the congressional intent of the act); Great N. Ry. Co. v.
Merchs. Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 290 (1922) (deciding whether an administrative rule may
be interpreted by courts without interfering with the Commerce Act).
20. See Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. at 448 (holding that a shipper must initially seek
redress with the ICC for being charged an unreasonable rate).
21. See infra Part II.A (tracing the development of the primary jurisdiction doctrine).
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considerations, such as the burden imposed on the parties, which make
discretionary review more appropriate.2
A. Origins and Development
Primary jurisdiction finds its inception in the Supreme Court's decision
in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 2 3 Abilene brought
suit in state court alleging that it was charged an unreasonable rate to ship
goods from Louisiana to Texas. 4 Texas & Pacific Railway responded that
the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim, and that, even if
jurisdiction was properly vested in the court, it could not grant relief because
the ICC had already accepted the rate as reasonable.2 5  To resolve the
controversy, the Court had to determine the effect of the Commerce Act, and
its establishment of the ICC, on the jurisdiction and remedial powers of the
courts-an issue of first impression.26 The Court held that the ICC alone was
empowered to hear in the first instance a claim based on the reasonableness
of a carrier's rates.27 The Court reasoned that the core objective of the Act-
and one of the primary functions of the ICC-was to ensure uniformity and
to prevent discrimination in the rates charged by carriers. 28 This purpose
would be frustrated if courts and juries were allowed to pass judgment on
established rates.29 Without uniformity, the Court posited, the Act would
become a nullity.
30
In Abilene Cotton, the Court relied on a statutory requirement of
uniformity to determine the jurisdiction of the courts in relation to the
agency. 3' Consequently, maintaining uniformity in a regulatory scheme
22. See CORA M. THOMPSON, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 89.05 (3d ed. 1999)
(stating that primary jurisdiction is a flexible doctrine to be applied at the discretion of the
district court).
23. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907) (holding that
claims based upon the reasonableness of a carrier's rates are within the primary jurisdiction of
the ICC); see Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1037, 1042 (1964)
(describing Abilene Cotton as the "germinal decision" in this area).
24. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. at 430.
25. Id. at 431.
26. Id. at 437.
27. Id. at 448.
28. Id. at441.
29. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440 (1907).
30. Id. at 441.
31. See id. at 446 (noting that interpreting the Commerce Act to provide concurrent,
original jurisdiction would cause the Act to destroy itself).
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became a persuasive reason for referring a claim to an agency in the first
instance, and thus a tenet of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Fifteen years
later, in another case dealing with the ICC, the Supreme Court placed an
important limit on the deference given to agencies in the name of uniformity.
In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co.,32 the Court
distinguished precedent following Abilene Cotton and maintained the
jurisdiction of the lower court to hear the claim.33
Merchants Elevator brought suit to contest a reconsignment charge
imposed when it shipped sixteen railway cars of corn from Iowa and Nebraska,
through Willmar, Minnesota-where the reconsignment occurred-to the
corn's final destination in Anoka, Minnesota.34 Merchants Elevator argued that
the charge should not be applied because the shipment fell within a regulatory
exception.35 Whether the exception applied, however, did not reach the
Supreme Court. Rather, the question on appeal was whether the lower court
had jurisdiction to hear the claim before the ICC had been given the
opportunity to consider it.36  While reaffirming that uniformity was "the
paramount purpose of the Commerce Act," the Court concluded that uniformity
could be maintained without first referring the issue to the ICC.
3 7
The Court declared that the issue presented to the trial court by Merchants
Elevator was one of tariff construction-purely a question of law.38 Uniformity
was not threatened because any interpretation given to the tariff by lower courts
could ultimately be reviewed by the Supreme Court.39 While holding that the
lower court had jurisdiction to interpret the tariff, the Court emphasized that the
language of the tariff was employed in its usual, ordinary meaning.4n The Court
explicitly stated that cases may arise in which deference to agency expertise
would be necessary because of conflicting evidence, intricate facts, or words
imbued with peculiar meaning.4' Although only dicta, the reference to cases
32. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchs. Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922) (holding that a
question of statutory interpretation, without more, does not invoke the primary jurisdiction of
the ICC).
33. See id. at 289 (pointing out that at trial Great Northern relied on cases such as Tex. &
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Am. Tie & Timber Co., 234 U.S. 138 (1914), and that the issue on appeal was
whether the trial court had jurisdiction in light of those precedents).
34. Id. at 288.
35. Id. at 289.
36. Great N. Ry. Co., 259 U.S. at 290.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 290.
39. Id. at 290-91.
40. Id. at 294.
41. GreatN. Ry. Co., 259U.S. at291.
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requiring agency expertise laid the groundwork for what came to be another
tenet of primary jurisdiction. Future cases heeded the Court's caveat and
proper utilization of agency expertise became a persuasive rationale for
42deferring to the jurisdiction of the agency.
Over the next thirty years, lower courts utilized Abilene Cotton and
Merchants Elevator to develop the principle at the heart of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine. The principle, as announced in Far East Conference v.
United States,43 is "that in cases raising issues of fact not within the
conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of
administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the
subject matter should not be passed over."44 The underlying dispute involved
the Far East Conference, an association of steamship carriers, operating under
an agreement that provided two fee schedules: one schedule for shippers
who agreed to contract exclusively with Conference members; and a second,
higher schedule for shippers who refused to bind themselves to the
Conference.45 The United States brought suit alleging violations of antitrust
laws.46 The Conference, and the Federal Maritime Board as intervener,
argued that the claim should be dismissed and reviewed initially by the
Board.47 The Court agreed, finding that utilization of administrative
expertise was necessary.48 Specifically, it concluded that the question of
whether the Conference's agreement contravened the Shipping Act involved
facts peculiar to the international shipping industry and a need for technical
knowledge that courts generally do not possess.49
After Far East Conference, applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine is
no longer equivalent to a finding of exclusive agency jurisdiction, which is a
42. See Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573-74 (1952) (quoting
controlling precedent that referred the issue to the agency because it involved factual
considerations unfamiliar to a judge).
43. See Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952) (holding that the lower
court lacked the requisite expertise to determine whether an agreement involving carriers
engaged in foreign trade complied with the Shipping Act).
44. Id. at 574.
45. Id. at 571-72.
46. Id. at 570.
47. Id. at 572; see also id. at 578 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (explaining that rate schedules
approved by the Board and deemed compliant with the Shipping Act were exempt from the
Sherman Act).
48. Far E. Conference, 342 U.S. at 573-74 (relying on United States Navigation Co. v.
Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932), because that case also involved the Sherman Act,
the Shipping Act, and a similar dual-rate system).
49. Id. at 573.
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marked departure fromAbilene Cotton. This change manifests itself in the opinion
in two ways. First, the Court recognized that preliminary resort to an agency may be
necessary even when the legal consequences of the administrative ruling have to be
judicially determined.5° In other words, application of the doctrine may be
appropriate even though the agency action will not completely resolve the case.
Second, the Court provided lower courts the option either to stay proceedings while
the agency action is pending, or to dismiss the proceedings entirely.51 In this regard,
Far East Conference presumes that the claim is originally cognizable by both the
court and agency. Otherwise, dismissal would have been mandatory and the lower
court would not have been able to stay the proceedings and retain jurisdiction.
Four years later, the Court decided United States v. Western Pacific Railroad
Co.,52 perhaps the most frequently cited opinion discussing the primaryjurisdiction
doctrine. In Western Pacific, the issue on appeal was whether the Court of Claims
had properly applied the doctrine. 53 Three rail companies sued the United States for
failure to pay the full amount charged for the shipment of bomb casings filled with
napalm gel.54 Having deemed the casings to be "incendiary bomb[s]," the carriers
charged the first-class rate. 55 Because napalm is not self-igniting, and the fuses were
not included in the shipments, the Government paid the lower fifth-class rate
applicable to gasoline drums.56 The Government argued that the higher rate was
inapplicable because the casings were not "incendiary bombs. 57 Or, alternatively,
if the higher rate applied, it would be unreasonable and the issue ought to be
referred to the ICC.58 The Court held that the issues of interpretation and
reasonableness were matters for the Commission's initial review,59 because the
60setting of rates involved various cost-allocation factors unfamiliar to the courts,
and because this was not purely a question of law as in Merchants Elevator.
61
50. Id. at 574.
51. Id. at 576-77.
52. See United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956) (holding that the lower
court erred by failing to refer to the ICC the determination of the applicable shipping rate and
the evaluation of the reasonableness of that rate).
53. Id at 62.
54. Id. at 60.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 60-61.
57. See W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 61 (noting the Government argued that without
bursters or fuses the casings lacked the "essential characteristics" of incendiary bombs).
58. Id. at 61-62.
59. Id. at 70.
60. See id. at 68 (finding that without such knowledge the courts would be engaging in
"judicial guesswork").
61. See id. at 69 (explaining that the interpretation and reasonableness of the tariff were
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In so holding, the Court set forth the basic primary-jurisdiction analysis. It
first declared that "[n]o fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. ''62 It went on to say, however, that "[i]n every case the question is
whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and whether the
purposes it serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation.
63
Referring to Abilene Cotton and Far East Conference, the Court defined the
purposes of the doctrine as the uniformity achieved when the agency initially
reviews certain administrative questions and the proper utilization of the special
knowledge and expertise of agencies. 64 Continuing its departure from Abilene
Cotton, the Court in Western Pacific made the doctrine more sensitive to the
particular litigation at hand. If no fixed formula exists, then applying the doctrine
cannot simply be a matter of statutory interpretation, as it was in Abilene Cotton
and Merchants Elevator. It must involve some contextual analysis.
The Court added a third, albeit less prominent, consideration to the primary
jurisdiction analysis in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange65-whether the
adjudication of the issue by the agency will materially aid the court.66 Similar to
Western Pacific, the question on appeal was whether the circuit below had
properly stayed the proceedings in order to invoke the primary jurisdiction
doctrine.67 The issue arose out of Ricci's complaint that the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange revoked his membership without notice or a hearing in contravention
of the Exchange's rules and the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).68 Ricci
further alleged that the Exchange's actions were part of a conspiracy to restrain
his business in violation of the Sherman Act.69
The Court held that the Commodity Exchange Commission should first
decide whether the revocation violated the Exchange's rules or the CEA.70 The
Court reasoned that such prior administrative action would assist the judiciary
"so intertwined that the same factors [were] determinative on both issues").
62. United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
63. Id
64. Id.
65. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973) (holding that the court of
appeals properly ordered a stay of the proceedings pending the Commodity Exchange
Commission's determination of whether the Chicago Mercantile Exchange violated the
Commodity Exchange Act when it revoked Ricci's membership).
66. See id. at 302 (listing the three related premises on which the judgment rested).
67. Id. at 290.
68. Id. at 290-91.
69. Id; see Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (2000)) (prohibiting the formation of monopolies and any contract or conspiracy to
restrain trade).
70. Ricci, 409 U.S. at 302.
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regardless of the outcome.71 On the one hand, if the Commission found that the
Exchange violated either its rules or the CEA, then any need for judicial
consideration of the antitrust issues would disappear.72 On the other hand, if the
Commission found the revocation to be valid, then the lower court would be
better positioned to make an informed and precise determination whether the
CEA provided antitrust immunity for the alleged conduct.73 The Court
emphasized that it was not deciding whether the Commission had authority to
hear the antitrust issue, but that it was simply utilizing a specialized agency to
determine the facts and interpret the relevant agency rules.74
The application of primaryjurisdiction in Ricci represents the culmination
of the doctrine's development. Most notably, Ricci makes clear that primary
jurisdiction is not actually jurisdictional. Unlike earlier cases, the Ricci Court
explicitly refused to make a final jurisdictional determination. The Court
stated: "We need not finally decide the jurisdictional issue for present
purposes, but there is sufficient statutory support for administrative authority in
this area that the agency should at least be requested to institute proceedings.
7 5
Under this conception, although it does not appear that the agency need have
jurisdiction at all, primary jurisdiction is most appropriately applied in cases
where the court and agency share original jurisdiction. As a result, the doctrine
has become apposite in more circumstances, and its use turns more on whether
its application is wise than whether it is legally required.
Reiter v. Cooper76 is the most recent Supreme Court case addressing the
primary jurisdiction doctrine in a substantial manner.77 Although Reiter does
71. See id. at 307-08 (noting the benefits of each of the possible administrative rulings).
72. See id. at 306 (stating that if the Commission rules in favor of Ricci, "the immunity issue
will dissolve").
73. See id. (stating that the agency could "prepare the way" for the court).
74. Id. at 307.
75. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 304 (1973).
76. See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258 (1993) (holding that, when a carrier sues to collect its
fees and the shipper argues in response that the rates are unreasonable, whether a court may
proceed directly to judgment or must wait for the ICC to rule on the reasonableness depends on the
equities of the case). In Reiter, Cooper was the bankruptcy trustee for Carolina Motor Express
(CME), a certified carrier regulated by the ICC. Id. at 261-62. Reiter and Califomia Consolidated
Enterprises (CCE) had negotiated with CME for shipping rates below those filed with the ICC. Id
When CME went bankrupt, Cooper initiated proceedings to collect the difference between the rates
paid and the rates filed. Id. at 262. Reiter and CCE then asserted two counterclaims: (1) that
charging more than the agreed-upon rate was an "unreasonable practice" under the Interstate
Commerce Act; and (2) that the rates as filed were unreasonably high. Id. at 261. In response to
these counterclaims, Cooper argued that they were within the primary jurisdiction of the ICC. Id. at
268. The Court held, however, that the counterclaims did not have to be referred to the ICC before
the lower court could enter judgment on Cooper's original claim for undercharges. Id. at 269.
77. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644,673-74 (2003) (discussing
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not alter the primary jurisdiction analysis, it provides a helpful explanation of the
procedure underlying the doctrine. The Court explained that once an issue is found
to be within the special competence of an agency, the primaryjurisdiction doctrine
allows a "referral" of that issue to the agency. 78 The Court clarified that the issue
remains within the power of the court to adjudicate and that a referral does not
deprive the court of its jurisdiction.79 In addition, the Court reaffirmed the notion
from Far East Conference that once primaryjurisdiction is invoked, the lower court
has discretion to dismiss the action pending an administrative ruling.80 Or, if such
dismissal would be unfair to one of the parties, the court may retain its jurisdiction.8'
For a more detailed analysis of the contemporary application of the doctrine, one
must turn to the circuit courts.
B. Current Application
The opinion of the Tenth Circuit in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v.
Bureau ofLandManagement?2 provides a useful illustration of a recent application
of the doctrine, as well as an acknowledgement of the split in the circuits over the
appropriate standard of review.83 Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), an
environmental protection group, brought suit against three county governments in
southern Utah to halt construction on various roads located on federal lands
managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).84 SUWA also brought suit
against the BLM alleging that it had violated its duties by allowing the construction
to commence.85 The BLM filed cross-claims against the counties for trespass and
degradation of federal property.86 In response, the counties argued that the
primaryjurisdiction only in the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 381 n.8 (1999) (referencing primary jurisdiction once in a footnote); Nw.
Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 366-67 (1994) (citing the doctrine briefly but
failing to invoke it as the parties did not brief or argue the issue).
78. Reiter, 507 U.S. at 268-69 (describing the referral process).
79. Id. at 268.
80. Id. at 268-69.
81. Id.
82. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir.
2005) (holding that the BLM did not have primary jurisdiction to determine whether county
governments had valid rights-of-way to conduct construction activities on federal land).
83. See id. at 750 (pointing out that, like the Fourth and D.C. Circuits, it reviews primary
jurisdiction decisions for an abuse of discretion while other circuits review such decisions de
novo).
84. Id. at 742.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 742-43.
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construction activities were lawful because of sixteen rights-of-way granted by
Congress in the Mining Act of 1866."7 The district court concluded that the BLM
should determine initially whether the counties did in fact have valid rights-of-way,
and whether the construction activities fell within the scope of those rights-of-way.
88
As such, the district court stayed the proceedings and referred the issue to the BLM,
which then conducted an informal adjudication.89 At the conclusion of the
adjudication, the BLM determined that the counties were entitled to only one right-
of-way and that they had exceeded the scope of that right-of-way.90 SUWA then
returned to the district court to enforce the BLM's conclusions, which the court
affirmed as supported by substantial evidence. 91 One of the threshold issues the
Tenth Circuit confronted on appeal was whether the district court erred by treating
the result of the adjudication as final agency action under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).92 In order to resolve this issue, however, the court first had
to address the question of whether the claim should have been referred to the
BLM in the first place.93
Before tackling these issues, the Tenth Circuit provided a thorough
discussion of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. 94 It first stated that primary
jurisdiction is a prudential doctrine arising in cases where Congress has placed
an issue within the "special competence" of an agency.95 The doctrine serves
two purposes, promoting both regulatory uniformity and resort to agency
expertise, 96 and it allows a court to stay judicial proceedings pending
appropriate administrative action.97 Such a description is generally in accord
with how other circuits have defined primary jurisdiction;98 however, the
circuits have diverged on additional considerations. Some circuits have taken
87. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 425 F.3d at 740, 743 (citing the Mining Act of 1866,
codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932, repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976).
88. Id. at 743.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 743-44.
92. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 750 (10th
Cir. 2005) (noting that if the referral to the BLM was in fact a primary jurisdiction referral, then
the district court was limited to reviewing for substantial evidence).
93. Id. at 751.
94. Id. at 750-51.
95. Id. at 750 (quoting United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956)).
96. Id. at 751 (citing Abilene Cotton and Far East Conference).
97. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 425 F.3d at 750-51.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Haun, 124 F.3d 745, 750 (6th Cir. 1997) (describing briefly
the primary jurisdiction doctrine).
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into account some or all of the following in addition to the twin aims of the
doctrine: the benefit to the court of an agency determination;99 the burden on
the parties of withholding judicial relief;' 00 the need to maintain the proper
working relationship between courts and agencies;' 0' and the desire to avoid
potential interference with an agency's performance of its statutory
responsibilities.
0 2
After generally describing the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the Tenth
Circuit stated that "[a]ll of this assumes that Congress has, by statute, given
authority over the issue to an administrative agency."'10 3  The court then
reviewed the relevant legislative enactments and the historical practices under those
acts, concluding that Congress had not intended the BLM to have authority to make
determinations on the rights-of-way at issue.1 4 Thus, the BLM did not have
primary jurisdiction over SUWA's claim, and the district court had abused its
discretion by deferring to the agency. 05 Because the BLM failed to meet this
threshold requirement, the Tenth Circuit did not have to address other primary
jurisdiction considerations. 0 6 On remand, the district court was to complete a
plenary review of the claims, and the administrative record created by the BLM was
to be admitted as evidence, not as a binding administrative decision.'0 7
99. See, e.g., Rymes Heating Oils, Inc. v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 358 F.3d 82, 91
(1 st Cir. 2004) (considering "whether... agency determination would materially aid the court"),
100. See, e.g., Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 201(5th Cir. 1988)
(stating that a court may defer only if the benefits of agency review exceed the costs imposed on
the parties); Nat'l Commc'ns Ass'n, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 220, 223, 225 (2nd
Cir. 1995) (considering "the fair administration of justice" as a factor).
101. See, e.g., In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1162 (3d
Cir. 1993) (stating that primary jurisdiction structures proceedings "so as to engender an orderly
and sensible coordination of the work of agencies and courts"); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Nedlloyd, 817
F.2d 1022, 1026 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[T]he principal reason why such a doctrine exists is to
encourage a court and agency to act in coordination with one other.").
102. See, e.g., Marshall v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 (10th Cir.
1989) (finding that if primary jurisdiction applies, "the courts will refrain from entertaining the
case until the agency has fulfilled its statutory obligation").
103. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 751 (10th Cir.
2005).
104. See id. at 757 (noting that the long history of administrative practice under the statute
reinforced the court's decision).
105. Id.
106. See id. at 751 (stating that without sufficient administrative authority over the issue,
there is no need to assess uniformity and expertise).
107. See id. at 757 (noting that the BLM is always allowed to consider the validity of
rights-of-way for its own purposes via a process called "administrative determinations").
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The Seventh Circuit in Arsberry v. Illinois'0 8 took a different approach and
found that there are actually two incarnations of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.'0 9
The court called the first incarnation the central and original form: "[I]t applies only
when, in a suit involving a regulated firm but not brought under the regulatory
statute itself, an issue arises that is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
regulatory agency."" 0  Under this form of the doctrine, a court must stop the
proceedings and refer the issue to the agency.' 11 Such a view of primary jurisdiction
is in accord with the Supreme Court's opinions in Abilene Cotton and Merchants
Elevator. The Abilene Cotton Court found that if congressional intent was to place
the issue in the hands of the administrative body alone, referral was required." 2
The second form ofprimaryjurisdiction only muddles the doctrine, according
to the Seventh Circuit, because it has nothing to do with actual jurisdiction. ' ' 3 This
latter form arises when the court and agency have concurrent jurisdiction over the
issue, or the agency has no jurisdiction at all.1 4 It allows the court to refer the issue
to an agency in order to promote the reasons underlying the primary jurisdiction
doctrine, particularly utilization of agency expertise.' ' The Seventh Circuit posits
that this second form is akin to the Burford abstention doctrine, "or cases in which
108. See Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the lower court
erred by invoking the primary jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
to dismiss a claim that alleged collusive agreements between telephone companies and the state
penitentiary system). In Arsberry, prison inmates and their loved-ones brought suit against the
State for violations of state and federal law, including the Sherman Act. Id. at 561. The
plaintiffs challenged the practice whereby each prison contracted with one phone company to
provide exclusive telephone service to the inmates in exchange for fifty percent of the revenue.
Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the rates charged were exorbitant and unreflective of the actual
costs of providing the service and that the payments to the prisons amounted to "kickbacks." Id.
at 561-62. The district court dismissed the suit, reasoning that the filed-rate doctrine (a rule
forbidding a regulated entity to charge a rate other than the one filed with the agency) and the
primary jurisdiction doctrine applied. Id. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held, among other
things, that the primary jurisdiction doctrine did not deprive the lower court ofjurisdiction to
hear the complaint. Id. at 563. First, the plaintiffs were not seeking a rate change. Id. Second,
the FCC had no authority to approve a collusive agreement among the telephone companies. Id
at 564. And third, the court had no reason to believe that the FCC knew anything useful in
evaluating the claim. Id.
109. Id. at 563.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907)
(concluding that a challenge to the reasonableness of rates must be filed with the ICC).
113. See Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 563 (stating that the second form "obscures the core of the
doctrine").
114. Id. at 564.
115. Id. at 563.
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the court has in effect appointed the agency to be a special master."' 16 This view of
the doctrine closely parallels the Supreme Court's application of primary
jurisdiction in Ricci, in which the Court referred an issue to the Exchange
Commission in order to utilize the Commission's expertise, not because the issue
was within the Commission's exclusive power to decide.17
The Seventh Circuit's view of the doctrine is not unpersuasive, but its position
is not widely shared among the circuits.1 8 Primary jurisdiction is a court-created
concept and is therefore subject to modification.19 The Supreme Court has not
obscured the doctrine, so much as refined it. Thus, this Note will treat primary
jurisdiction as the Court has described it most recently, 120 and how the majority of
circuits apply it: as a single doctrine suitable to a number of contexts,'12' and
jurisdictional only insofar as jurisdiction is always a threshold inquiry, that is,
whether the court has the power to hear the claim.'
22
C. The Circuit Split
As recently noted by the Tenth Circuit, the circuits are currently
divided on the standard of review appropriate for reviewing a primary
jurisdiction decision. The Third, 123 Fourth, 124 Fifth, 12 Tenth, 2 6 and D.C.
116. Id. at 563-64.
117. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 304, 307 (1973) (referring the
issue to obtain the Commission's view on whether its membership rules had been violated,
while declining to define the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction).
118. Cf ASAP Paging, Inc. v. CenturyTel of San Marcos Inc., 137 Fed. Appx. 694, 697
(5th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion) (noting that primary jurisdiction is not applicable to the
case at bar under either form described in Arsberry). ASAP Paging is one of the few cases
outside of the Seventh Circuit applying Arsberry's two forms of primary jurisdiction.
119. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command; rather, it is a principle of policy .... ").
120. See supra Part II.A (discussing Ricci and Reiter).
121. See United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956) ("No fixed formula
exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.").
122. See infra Part IV.A (describing the analytical steps in applying primary jurisdiction).
123. See In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1162 (3d Cir.
1993) (declaring that a decision not to submit an issue to an agency will be reviewed only for an
abuse of discretion).
124. See Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 789 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that
decisions regarding primary jurisdiction are reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
125. See Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1988)
(declaring primary jurisdiction to be a "flexible doctrine to be applied at the discretion of the
district court").
126. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735,750 (10th
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Circuits127 review for an abuse of discretion. In contrast, the Second,
128
Eighth,129 and Ninth Circuits130 review such decisions de novo. The remaining
circuits-the First,'3 ' Sixth,132 Seventh,133 and Eleventh Circuits' 34-are unclear as
to the standard they apply.
1. The De Novo Circuits
Turning first to the circuits that have explicitly applied the de novo
standard, it appears that none has adequately justified its choice. Of the three,
the Second Circuit is apparently the most committed to de novo review. That
circuit corrected the language of an earlier opinion by declaring that "[a]lthough
sometimes framed in terms of whether the district court abused its
discretion ... the standard of review is essentially de novo. '' 135 The Second
Cir. 2005) ("This Court... reviews decisions regarding primary jurisdiction under an abuse of
discretion standard.").
127. See Nat'l Tel. Coop. Ass'n v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 244 F.3d 153,156 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(reviewing for an abuse of discretion).
128. See Nat'l Commc'ns Ass'n, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 220, 222 (2d Cir.
1995) ("Although sometimes framed in terms of whether the district court abused its
discretion... the standard of review is essentially de novo.").
129. See United States v. Henderson, 416 F.3d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 2005) ("This court
appears to review primary jurisdiction de novo.").
130. See United States v. Culliton, 328 F.3d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Because we can
affirm... under de novo review, we find it unnecessary to speculate further on the proper
standard in these types of cases.").
131. See Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Mass. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 196 F.3d 302, 303
(1st Cir. 1999) ("[T]he District Court had erred in failing to refer a number of questions to the
EPA under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction."); U.S. Pub. Interest Research Group v. Atl.
Salmon of Maine, LLC, 339 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Accordingly, a refusal in this case to
make a primary jurisdiction reference prior to the state's issuance of the permit was neither a
mistake of law nor an abuse of discretion.").
132. See United States v. Haun, 124 F.3d 745, 747 (6th Cir. 1997) (reviewing the order of
dismissal de novo as a question of statutory interpretation without adopting a standard for
primary jurisdiction).
133. See Johnson v. Artim Transp. Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d 538, 548 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting
that cases may arise in which it would be "plain error" for the district court to refuse to apply the
doctrine); Marseilles Hydro Power, LLC v. Marseilles Land and Water Co., 299 F.3d 643,652
(7th Cir. 2002) ("The question whether to stay the suit is something for the district court to
decide in the first instance.").
134. See Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1264-66 (11 th Cir. 2000) (deciding
that preemption was the dispositive issue and reviewing that issue under the de novo standard,
while also equating primary jurisdiction with Burford abstention, which, the court notes, is
generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
135. Nat'l Commc'nsAss'n, Inc. v. Am. Tel.& Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 220,222 (2d Cir. 1995)
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Circuit, unfortunately, provided no further explanation or citation in support of
its conclusion. 1
36
The remaining de novo circuits specifically avoided addressing the
standard of review issue. The Eighth Circuit in Access Telecommunications v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 137 reviewed the district court's determination
de novo at the request of the parties, who assumed that to be the law of the
circuit. 138 And the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Culliton,139 stated that it
could affirm the district court's decision under a de novo standard and that it
took no position on what the appropriate standard should be. 140  Both the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits declined to confront the issue and reasoned that it
was better left to a case in which the parties actually contested it.'
41
2. The Abuse of Discretion Circuits
As for the abuse of discretion circuits, the amount of discussion in support
of the standard of review is minimal, but more informative than the de novo
(citations omitted).
136. Id.
137. See Access Telecomms. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 137 F.3d 605 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding
that a dispute over. the categorization of telephonic services, and the reasonableness of that
categorization, was within the primary jurisdiction of the FCC). Access Telecommunications
(AT), a long distance reseller, brought suit against Southwestern Bell (SWBT) alleging that it
had been overcharged for telephonic services. Id. at 607. In response, SWBT moved to dismiss
arguing that the issues were within the primary jurisdiction of the FCC. Id. Although noting
that AT could have filed its claim with either court or agency, the district court agreed with
SWBT and dismissed the complaint. Id. On appeal, AT argued that there was a distinction
between challenging the reasonableness of a rate-to which primary jurisdiction would apply-
and challenging a violation of a rate-what AT alleged in its complaint. Id. at 608. The Eighth
Circuit disagreed with this distinction, finding that the issue actually involved the classification
of the services AT had purchased and whether that classification was reasonable. Id. at 608-09.
This issue, the court held, was within the statutory authority of the FCC. Id at 609. The court
upheld the district court's decision. Id.
138. Id. at608.
139. See United States v. Culliton, 328 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the primary
jurisdiction doctrine did not bar the lower court from determining whether the defendant
defrauded the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)). In Culliton, the Ninth Circuit addressed
the scope of the FAA's primary jurisdiction over medical certifications. Id. at 1076. The issue
arose from Culliton's jury conviction for making false statements on a medical form. Id.
Culliton appealed arguing that the FAA had sole authority to prosecute false statements and that
the court below erroneously entertained the criminal prosecution. Id. at 1082. Because the
court found no statutory or regulatory support for this proposition, the Ninth Circuit held that
the district court properly proceeded with the case. Id.
140. Id. at 1081.
141. Id.; Access Telecomms., 137 F.3d at 608.
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circuits. The Tenth Circuit presents the clearest reasoning. It analogizes
primary jurisdiction to the Burford abstention doctrine in support of the abuse
of discretion standard.142  Burford abstention arises when a federal court
refrains from hearing a case and defers to the jurisdiction of a state court or
agency due to a complex state regulatory scheme. 143 The objectives and
application of the Burford abstention doctrine are quite similar to primary
jurisdiction. 44 As such, it will be considered in more detail in Part V.B.
The remaining circuits are less clear in their rationale. While explaining
the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the Third Circuit quotes the Supreme Court in
stating that the doctrine requires "judicial abstention in cases where protection
of the integrity of a regulatory scheme dictates preliminary resort to the
agency."'145 The Third Circuit did not explicitly link this language to the
appropriate standard of review, but the court's more recent opinions help make
the connection. 46 The most probable inference is that the Third Circuit
considers primary jurisdiction a type of abstention doctrine. The Fourth and
D.C. Circuits, which also review for an abuse of discretion, cite to the Third
Circuit without explanation. 1
47
If the inferences are accurate, then the Third, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits are
relying on the standard of review for abstention doctrines to provide the
appropriate standard for primaryjurisdiction. One problem with this approach
is that the Supreme Court has not declared a single standard of review for all
abstention orders, 148 and there are multiple forms of abstention.1
49
142. See Marshall v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir. 1989)
(citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318 (1943)).
143. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 8-9(8th ed. 2004) (describing in general terms when
Burford abstention is applicable).
144. See infra Part V.B (comparing primary jurisdiction to Burford abstention).
145. Cheyney State Coll. Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732,736 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353 (1963)) (emphasis added).
146. See In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1162 (3d Cir.
1993) (citing to the portion of Cheyney State College in which Philadelphia National Bank is
quoted, while stating that the district court's decision will be reversed only for an abuse of
discretion); Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., Inc., 856 F.2d 546,549 (3d
Cir. 1988) (same).
147. See Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 789 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing In re
Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1162 (3d Cir. 1993)); United States
v. Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 717 F.2d 593, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing Cheyney State
Coll. Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 736 (3d Cir. 1983)).
148. MOORE, supra note 10, § 22.08[2].
149. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716-18 (1996) (collecting the
recognized abstention cases).
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Nevertheless, most circuits do in fact review all abstention decisions for an
abuse of discretion. 5°
111. Examining the Review Standards
A. De Novo Review: Plenary Appellate Power
As a general matter, circuit courts have plenary authority over the final
decisions of district courts.15 This power of review promotes both doctrinal
coherence and decisional accuracy because, in most cases, the fast pace of
litigation forces trial judges to make determinations without "extended
reflection [or] extensive information."' 52 Appellate courts, in contrast, receive
briefs from each of the parties who refine the issues and present detailed
research and analysis. 153 The multi-judge panels of appellate courts can then
engage in "reflective dialogue" and assert their "collective judgment.' 54 One
of the reviewing judges may be able to contribute a "fresh insight" not thought
of by the trial court or counsel.' 55 Or, perhaps more importantly, appellate
review may prevent decisions influenced by subconscious prejudices.' 56 In
light of the advantages of the appellate forum, it is fitting that circuit courts are
able to review the record de novo and reach an independent conclusion. 157 In
cases that depart from the de novo standard, there is usually some kind of
150. Cf MOORE, supra note 10, § 22.08[2] (finding that the Sixth, Eighth, and D.C.
Circuits do not review all abstention decisions for an abuse of discretion).
151. See 28 U.S.C. § 291 (2000) (stating that the United States Courts of Appeals have
jurisdiction over all final decisions of the District Courts). But see Commercial Standards Ins.
Co. v. Bryce St. Apts., Ltd., 703 F.2d 904, 908 (5th Cir. 1983) ("We take this occasion to
repeat: we do not sit to hear cases de novo.").
152. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225,231-32 (1991) (quoting Dan Coenen, To
Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on
State Law, 73 MINN. L. REv. 899, 923 (1989)).
153. See id. at 232 ("As questions of law become the focus of appellate review, it can be
expected that the parties' briefs will be refined to bring to bear on the legal issues more
information and more comprehensive analysis than was provided for the district judge.").
154. Id.
155. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 757 (1982).
156. See id. at 757-58 (referring not to the "rare cases of venality or of prejudice in its most
pejorative sense, but rather [to] the subconscious mind-set from which few judges are
immune").
157. See CHILDRESS, supra note 11, § 2.14 (stating that de novo review is a convenient
shorthand way of saying "independent conclusion on the record' with "no particular deference"
to the trial court).
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justification for giving deference to the trial court.158 For certain issues, such as
the trial court's superior factfinding ability, this deference is codified.
59
B. Abuse of Discretion Review: Degrees of Deference
When an issue is committed to the discretion of the trial court, the decision
of the judge is largely insulated from review. 160 This standard provides the trial
judge some leeway to be "wrong" without being reversed because the decision
will be affirmed even if the appellate court would have reached a different
conclusion. 161 There are several reasons why such discretion is given to lower
courts. First, it promotes judicial efficiency and finality. 62 If every decision of
the trial court was susceptible to easy reversal, the dockets of the appellate
courts would be overwhelmed, 63 and wealthy parties might be tempted to
abuse the system in order to wear down their opponents and prolong the
process.164
Second, the question presented may not be well suited to a general rule.165
Many issues which arise during litigation are novel, multifarious, fleeting, or
they "otherwise resist generalization."' 66 Therefore, "[w]hen the problem arises
in a context so new and unsettled that the rule-makers do not yet know what
158. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (pointing out that often the
appropriate standard of review for a given issue is defined by statute or by a long history of
appellate practice).
159. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.").
160. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 638 (1971) (stating that trial court discretion "is essentially a review-
limiting concept").
161. Id. at 648-49; see Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Review of Discretionary
Decisionmaking, 2 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 47,49 (2000) ("In review of discretion, the focus of
the reviewing court is supposed to be on the process used to reach the decision and not on the
decision itself.").
162. See Rosenberg, supra note 160, at 660-61 (mentioning as an additional reason for
trial court discretion the morale of trial judges, i.e., that searching review of every decision
might be oppressive and undermine ajudge's sense of dignity); Friendly, supra note 155, at 762
(noting that discretion extends just beyond the scope of the harmless error doctrine to prevent
useless appeals where a different result is unlikely on retrial).
163. Rosenberg, supra note 160, at 660.
164. Id. at 662.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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factors should shape the result, the case may be a good one to leave to lower
court discretion."' 
67
The third and most persuasive reason for conferring discretion on lower
courts is that they are better positioned to make the determination.' This
rationale is based in large part on the premise that the written trial record is an
inherently inadequate reflection of the actual proceedings. Because the
appellate judges were not there, they may be unaware of significant matters. 69
This rationale is also based on the idea of conserving appellate energies. Even
when appellate judges could acquire complete knowledge of the case from the
record, such knowledge may come at considerable and unjustifiable expense.17
0
The abuse of discretion standard is flexible and within its ambit there are
varying degrees of deference.' 71 As one commentator pointed out, "it cannot be
seriously claimed that the same abuse of discretion standard is used when a
judge refuses to award attorney fees to a prevailing civil rights plaintiff as when
she grants a one-day continuance." 1 72 Sometimes appellate treatment can vary
on a single issue; for example, a ruling on a motion for a new trial maybe given
greater weight depending on whether the motion was granted or denied. 173 The
varying degrees of deference cause the abuse of discretion standard to be highly
context sensitive. 74  As a general rule, the more reasons for trial court
discretion are present the more likely appellate courts will accord greater
deference."' Consequently, the best way to apply the standard to a given
167. Id.
168. Rosenberg, supra note 160, at 662; see Friendly, supra note 155, at 783 (concluding
that decisions which depend on direct contact with the litigation "merit[ ] a high degree of
insulation from appellate revision").
169. Rosenberg, supra note 160, at 663-64.
170. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560 (1988) (pointing out that obtaining a
degree of knowledge comparable to the trial judge would require review of the entire record, a
task to which appellate courts are unaccustomed).
171. See CHILDRESS, supra note 11, § 4.01(C) (declaring that there is no single abuse-of-
discretion standard); Friendly, supra note 155, at 763 (noting the conflicting definitions of the
phrase "abuse of discretion").
172. CHILDRESS, supra note 11, § 4.01(C).
173. Davis, supra note 161, at 81.
174. See CHILDRESS, supra note 11, § 4.01(C) ("[D]iscretion is reviewed for whether it was
abused under the relevant considerations."); Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil
Appeals, 229 F.R.D. 267, 294 (2005) (noting that the abuse of discretion test "has little meaning
if pulled from its precise procedural setting and application").
175. See CHILDRESS, supra note 11, § 4.01(C) (stating the strength of the factors that
determine the applicability of abuse of discretion, such asjudicial economy or use of evidentiary
facts, also weigh heavily as to the strength and scope of review within that standard).
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decision is to evaluate why the decision is committed to trial court discretion in
the first instance.
176
IV. Defining the Question: Factual, Legal, Mixed, or Discretionary
As a means of determining the standard of review, most decisions of a trial
court judge are placed into one of three categories: (1) questions of law,
reviewed de novo; (2) questions of fact, reviewed for clear error; and
(3) matters of discretion, reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 77 The mixed
question of law and fact belongs in the hazy meridian between the first and
second categories.178 With regard to primary jurisdiction, the circuits are split
between de novo and abuse of discretion review: No circuit has contended that
clear error is the appropriate standard. It therefore seems safe to assume that
the doctrine does not present a question purely of fact. 17 9 Discussion thus
centers on the first and third categories, and the enigmatic mixed question.
In Pullman-Standard v. Swint,180 the Court stated that mixed questions are
ones in which "the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is
undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or
176. See Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 185 (1978) (arguing
that trial court discretion is unruly and that "[t]o tame the concept requires no less than to force
ourselves to say why it is accorded or withheld").
177. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,558 (1988); see also Davis, supra note 161, at 50
(explaining that matters of discretion typically include trial supervision, conduct of the parties,
and admission of evidence).
178. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,288 (1982) (noting the "vexing nature
of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law").
179. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990) (stating that the
clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion standards are indistinguishable when an appellate
court reviews factual findings). Thus, even if primary jurisdiction presented purely a question
of fact, the debate would still boil down to a choice between some deference to the trial court
and de novo review. The need for deference, however, would be much clearer.
180. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (holding that whether the
disparate impact of a seniority system evidenced an intent to discriminate is a question of fact
subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review). In Swint, a group of black employees
brought suit against Pullman-Standard, a manufacturer of railway freight cars, and United
Steelworkers of America. Id. at 275. The plaintiffs alleged that the company's seniority system
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. The district court found no intention to
discriminate and held that the system complied with the act. Id. The Fifth Circuit, however,
reversed. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question of whether the court
of appeals was required to apply the clearly erroneous standard of review. Id. at 276. After
reviewing four considerations useful to the determination of discriminatory intent, id. at 279-82,
the Court held that such a finding was a pure question of fact. Id. at 287-88. The Court noted
that the district court was not faulted with misunderstanding the definition of discriminatory
intent, which would have amounted to legal error. Id. at 287.
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to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts
is or is not violated."' 8' The Court found that its precedents support the notion
that mixed questions are "independently reviewable,"182 suggesting a de novo
standard. More recently, however, the Court's approach to mixed questions has
not been so straightforward. In Pierce v. Underwood,183 the Court observed
that determining how to approach a mixed question on appeal could be
accomplished by deciding which judicial actor was "better positioned" to
resolve the issue. 84 A few years later, the Court said that "the characterization
of a mixed question of law and fact for one purpose does not govern its
characterization for all purposes."' 85 This has led some scholars to conclude
that mixed questions require case-by-case analysis. 86 As a result, defining an
individual question as "mixed" provides little help in determining the
appropriate standard of review.
Because categorizing primary jurisdiction as a mixed question will not
resolve the issue, it is helpful to turn to another category of decisionmaking,
namely, matters of discretion. As noted above, the reasons for conferring
181. Id. at 289 n.19.
182. Id.
183. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) (holding that the abuse of discretion
standard applies to awards of attorneys' fees in cases brought pursuant to the Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA)). Under the EAJA, the prevailing plaintiff in a civil suit against the
Government is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees unless the court determines the
Government's position was substantiallyjustified. Id. at 556. This case arose from a settlement
between Pierce, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and numerous plaintiffs. Id.
at 554-55. The District Court found that Pierce's predecessor had not been "substantially
justified" in his decision not to implement a certain subsidy program. Id. at 555. The District
Court therefore awarded attorneys' fees, and the Government appealed. Id. The first issue the
Supreme Court addressed was the appropriate standard of review. Id. 557. This issue is
particularly relevant to this Note because there was a split in the circuits: Some reviewed the
decision for an abuse of discretion while others reviewed it de novo. Id. at 558. The Court held
that abuse of discretion review should apply, id. at 562, and set forth various factors to consider
when deciding whether to give discretion to the trial court. Id. at 559-62. There are a couple of
factors which are not addressed in this Note because they are inapplicable to the primary
jurisdiction doctrine. The first omitted factor is the language and structure of the governing
statute. Id. at 559. The second omitted factor is the amount of liability typically produced by
the decision. Id. at 563. This second factor is inapposite here because applying primary
jurisdiction does not address the merits of a claim. Rather, it is a procedural doctrine, and it
does not impose liability in the same way that an award of attorneys' fees does.
184. Id. at 559-60.
185. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522 (1995).
186. See CHILDRESS, supra note 11, § 2.18 (arguing that appellate courts should not claim
"free review generally of mixed questions," but should narrow the inquiry "to the point at hand
and ask[ ] whether that point requires the development and application of their law-making
judgment").
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greater deference on the trial court are the promotion ofjudicial efficiency, the
inability to fashion a rule of decision, and the advantageous position of the trial
judge. 187 The problem with the first justification, whether it is expressed in
terms ofjudicial efficiency or finality, is that it provides little or no guidance as
to which decisions it applies. 188 It fails to discriminate among issues that are
unreviewable because the judicial system can always be streamlined by making
the trial court, in effect, the court of last resort. 189 Thus, the notion of judicial
efficiency is unhelpful and only the latter two reasons are worth considering
here.
A. The Trial Court's Proximity to the Issues
Starting with the third justification, the question is whether the trial court
is better positioned than the appellate court to make the primary jurisdiction
decision. Initially, a court must determine the scope of its jurisdiction vis-i-vis
the jurisdiction of the agency. If the court decides that the agency has
exclusive, original jurisdiction over the matter, then the court is powerless to
address it. Abilene Cotton exemplifies this analysis: Finding that uniformity
was the key objective to the Commerce Act, the Court concluded that Congress
had impliedly limited the jurisdiction of the lower courts with the creation of
the ICC.190 The inquiry was predominantly a matter of statutory interpretation,
although the Court also looked to the nature of the claim and the unique
demands of interstate regulation.' 91
Also at the outset, a court must determine whether Congress has placed
sufficient authority over the issue into the hands of the agency. This too is
predominantly a matter of statutory interpretation. 92  In Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance, after reviewing both statutes and historical administrative
187. See supra Part III.B (discussing Professor Rosenberg's analysis of when it is
appropriate to confer discretion on a trial court).
188. See Rosenberg, supra note 160, at 662 (noting the inherent problem with judicial
efficiency, finality, and trial-judge morale as reasons for providing trial-court discretion).
189. Id. at 660.
190. See supra Part II.A (discussing Abilene Cotton).
191. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440-41
(prohibiting courts from addressing claims predicated on the unreasonableness of shipping rates
because, unless all courts reached identical conclusions, standards would vary among the
jurisdictions and would frustrate the legislative goal of interstate uniformity).
192. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 751 (10th Cir.
2005) ("All this assumes that Congress has, by statute, given authority over the issue to an
administrative agency.").
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practices, the Tenth Circuit held that the BLM did not have authority over the
right-of-way issues, and therefore referral was inappropriate. 93 Looking at
Abilene Cotton and Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance together, nothing in the
analyses of the Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit suggests that the trial judges
were more qualified to make the decisions or that the records hindered the
quality of the appellate deliberations. Moreover, decisions that define the outer
bounds of court and agency authority carry law-clarifying benefits-the
benefits of appellate review the Court noted as important in Pierce.194 Thus,
the first step in the primary jurisdiction analysis fails to justify increased
deference to trial judges due to their proximity to the issues. This is an
uncontroversial conclusion considering that jurisdictional questions are
invariably reviewed by appellate courts de novo.
195
The second step in the primary jurisdiction analysis, in contrast, is more
complicated. Here, the court must evaluate whether the purposes of the
doctrine will be furthered by its application to the particular case. 196 The most
important factors to consider are the core aims of the doctrine: maintaining
regulatory uniformity and utilizing agency expertise. The circuits are divided
as to what other factors are relevant. 97 Two factors, however, find support in
Supreme Court precedents: the aid to the court of an administrative decision'
98
and the burden on the parties caused by referral. 99 In terms of which
decisionmaker is better positioned to weigh these factors, it appears that only
the last one is sufficiently fact sensitive to justify increased deference to the
trial judge. But, this last factor is so unique that it may, by itself, demand trial
court discretion. The following paragraphs consider each factor in turn.
193. See supra Part II.B (discussing Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance).
194. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561 (1988) (pointing out that with the
particular kind of issue at bar, the appellate decision would not produce the "law-clarifying
benefits" normally attendant review of questions of law).
195. See MooR-E, supra note 10, § 206.08 (finding that the standard of review is de novo
for jurisdictional issues).
196. See United States v. W. Pac. Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956) ("[T]he question is
whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it
serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation.").
197. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (listing various factors used by the
circuit courts).
198. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 302 (1973) (listing the three
premises on which the Court rested its judgment).
199. See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268-69 (1993) (stating that a district court may
dismiss the proceedings only if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged); Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,406 (1970) (finding primary jurisdiction inapplicable because the agency
lacked the appropriate procedures to address the petitioner's claim).
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1. Maintaining Regulatory Uniformity
If the need to maintain regulatory uniformity is a spectrum, then the
original primary jurisdiction issue-the reasonableness of rates charged by
interstate carriers-is at the most demanding end.200 The more the issue at bar
departs from that guidepost, the less this factor weighs in favor of a referral to
the agency. Specifically, a judge must look for the possibility that various
courts addressing the same regulatory issue will reach disparate results, and the
degree such results will undermine the regulatory scheme. Because this
determination typically depends on the plaintiff's cause of action,20 ' the
regulatory scheme implicated, °2 and the type of relief sought,20 3 facts specific
to the litigation are involved. But, the facts important to these considerations
probably can be gleaned from the pleadings alone, thereby putting appellate
courts on an equal footing with trial courts.
The Fifth Circuit in Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co. 204 provided a
helpful and concise example of this analysis.20 5 The court first noted that
numerous district courts had reached conflicting conclusions as to whether
take-or-pay clauses in producer-distributor contracts violated the price ceilings
of the federal Natural Gas Policy Act.20 6 In addition, some district courts had
200. See supra note 23-31 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's rationale in
Abilene Cotton). It is the most demanding because it resulted in complete abrogation of the
court's original jurisdiction.
201. See United States v. Henderson, 416 F.3d 686, 691 (2005) (finding that primary
jurisdiction was inapplicable because the defendant was charged with lying to the Social
Security Administration, which had nothing to do with eligibility for benefits or any other area
of agency discretion).
202. See Taffet v. Southern Co., 930 F.2d 847, 854 (11 th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that
primary jurisdiction does not justify referral to a state agency).
203. See Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 563 (2001) (holding primary jurisdiction
inapplicable because the plaintiffs did not seek a rate change; instead, they sought to nullify a
contractual arrangement on equitable grounds).
204. See Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that a dispute that turned on whether payments under a "take-or-pay" clause were a component
price of gas fell within the primary jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC)). ANR was a natural gas distributor that had contracted with Wagner & Brown
(W&B), a producer. Id. at 200. Under the terms of the contract, ANR agreed to a "take-or-pay"
clause whereby ANR was obligated to purchase 75% of the gas that W&B produced. Id. W&B
brought suit when ANR failed to take, or pay for, the required volume for several successive
years. Id. at 200-01. The district court dismissed W&B's complaint, finding that controlling
issues were within the primary jurisdiction of the FERC. Id. at 201. The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's order because it found that uniformity and expertise favored deferral. Id.
205. See id. at 202 (discussing the considerations of uniformity when applying the primary
jurisdiction doctrine).
206. Id.
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deferred to the primary jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), while others had not.20 7 The court reasoned that, because
the interstate market for gas is regulated under one act of Congress, the
"patchwork solution" the courts could provide, even with appellate review, was
insufficient.20 8 The problem required a "uniform resolution. 20 9
In addressing the primary jurisdiction consideration of uniformity, the
Fifth Circuit required few case-specific facts. The determination neither turned
on the identity of the litigants nor the credibility of the evidence. As a result, it
appears the record on appeal was adequate and the appellate judges would not
have benefited from direct observation of the litigation. This first factor, then,
weighs against increased deference to the trial judge.
2. Utilizing Agency Expertise
Turning to the second core purpose of primary jurisdiction, a court must
consider whether the issue is "within the conventional experience ofjudges.
' 2 10
With this factor, the Supreme Court has provided some guidance as to the
nature of the inquiry. In Merchants Elevator, the Court stated that resort to "a
body of experts" would be appropriate when the issue involves "voluminous
and conflicting evidence," intricate facts, or words used with a "peculiar
meaning.",2" Whether these are characteristics of the particular litigation
seems, at first blush, a decision for the trial judge. It is undisputed that trial
judges are accorded great deference with regard to the handling of evidence
212
and the marshalling of facts.213 And whether words are imbued with something
other than their conventional meaning is comparable to a finding of custom or
intent, which is also considered a finding of fact.214 By directly overseeing the
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Wagner & Brown, 837 F.2d at 202.
210. Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952).
211. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchs. Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922).
212. See CHILDRESS, supra note 11, § 4.02(A) (stating that evidentiary matters are
committed to the discretion of the trial court).
213. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous .... ").
214. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1982) (holding that whether
an employer had an intent to discriminate on the basis of race was a pure question of fact, not a
question of law, or even a mixed question of law and fact); see also CHILDRESS, supra note 11,
§ 2.23 (finding that "even contract interpretation is a question of fact under Rule 52 when
extrinsic evidence, such as the parties' intent, is considered").
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admission of evidence, one might argue, the trial judge is better able to
determine whether the evidence is sufficiently conflicting, the facts sufficiently
intricate, or the language sufficiently idiosyncratic to warrant referral to the
agency.
But this argument may assume too much. Just because the trial judge is
insulated from review on his findings of fact, e.g. that the evidence is
conflicting, does not mean that he is insulated from review on his legal
conclusions drawn from those findings, e.g. that the facts are sufficiently
conflicting to justify referral. Under the guidance of Merchants Elevator, the
expertise factor is best categorized as a mixed question of law and fact, that is,
whether the established facts satisfy the appropriate legal standard. 2 5 As a
result, the considerations set forth in Merchants Elevator may not point toward
216defining primary jurisdiction as a matter of discretion.
The Court's language in Port of Boston Marine Terminal Association v.
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic217 cuts further against deferential review of
the expertise factor. In that opinion, the Court discussed what it termed "almost
[a] classic case for engaging the doctrine., 218 The Court found that:
The District Court did not err in determining, for purposes of this litigation,
that an Article III Court, acting on a single, isolated case-and-controversy
record in a private suit in which neither the Commission nor the
Government was a party, would lack the requisite capacity.219
First, the use of the word "err" may imply an error of law. The Court could
have chosen language more indicative of trial court discretion.22 ° Second, the
215. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (defining mixed questions).
216. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (noting mixed questions have historically
been reviewed de novo).
217. See Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400
U.S. 62 (1970) (holding that a determination of the validity of an amendment to an agreement
regulated by the Shipping Act was within the primary jurisdiction of the Federal Maritime
Commission (FMC)). In Port of Boston Marine, the Court had to decide whether the FMC's
adjudication of a dispute was binding on the parties. Id. at 63-64. The Terminal Association,
under an agreement approved by the FMC, but without FMC approval, shifted a certain kind of
storage fee from the consignees of the cargo to the vessel owners. Id. at 64. Some of the
owners refused to pay, and the Terminal Association brought suit. Id. at 64-65. The district
court invoked the primaryjurisdiction of the FMC and stayed the proceedings to get a ruling on
the validity of the change to the agreement. Id. at 65. The Court held that the referral was
appropriate, id. at 69, and the administrative ruling in favor of the Terminal Association was
binding. Id. at 72.
218. Id. at 68.
219. Id. at 69.
220. See, e.g., Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 789 (4th Cir. 1996)
(stating that "[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion" in determining that the EPA's
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use of the phrase "an Article III Court" implies an evaluation of the capacity of
judges in general. It seems that weighing the expertise factor is not a matter of
what the particular judge overseeing the case knows, which would be reason to
defer to his decision, but what the typical judge knows.
One possible counter argument is that a trial judge is better able to
determine what other trial judges are familiar with, but this is unpersuasive for
a number of reasons. As a general proposition, appellate judges are often
former trial judges. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not refer specifically to
trial court judges. It referred to Article III Courts. The Court's statement
implies that all Article III Courts-trial and appellate-have the same
limitations. If this inference is correct, then whether the litigation reaches
beyond the knowledge of an Article III judge may be decided by an appellate
court as easily as a trial court. Port of Boston Marine, in sum, points against
increased deference to the trial court.
3. Benefiting the Court with Administrative Action
Like the aforementioned primary jurisdiction considerations, the third does
not present a compelling case for trial court discretion. The Supreme Court
first discusses the benefit to the court in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
and that case provides some insight into the analysis. In Ricci, once the Court
found "sufficient statutory support for administrative authority" over the
matter,221 this consideration weighed heavily in the Court's decision.222 The
Court concluded that an agency ruling would make a meaningful contribution
to the lawsuit for two main reasons: efficiency and accuracy.223 First, the
agency decision saves the district court from litigating any issues that the
agency can fully resolve.224 The administrative ruling might even moot the
entire judicial inquiry.225 Second, the agency can gather pertinent facts226 and
clarify the scope, meaning, and significance of the Exchange rules.227 This, the
special expertise was not needed).
221. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 304 (1973).
222. See id. at 302 (discussing the three premises on which the decision rested).
223. See id. at 305-06 (noting the benefits of prior agency adjudication).
224. Id. at 306.
225. Id.
226. Ricci, 409 U.S. at 305 n.15.
227. Id. at 305.
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Court declared, would "prepare the way... for a more informed and precise
determination. ,
228
In Ricci, both the majority and dissenting justices agreed that referral is
appropriate if it is "likely to make a meaningful contribution to the resolution of
[the] lawsuit., 229 The debate was not whether there was a benefit, but the
sufficiency of the benefit conferred. 230 The justices were divided not on the
legal standard, or even on the facts of the underlying case, but rather on the
conclusion to be drawn from those facts. Consequently, this factor, like the
expertise factor, presents a mixed question of law and fact-a type of question
that has not traditionally been given deference on appeal.23'
4. Weighing the Burdens
Of the four primary jurisdiction factors on which this Note focuses, the
last one presents the best argument for trial court discretion because it is the
most fact-and litigant-sensitive. The application ofprimaryjurisdiction will
always involve some amount of delay, and thus some degree of hardship. 232 As
Justice Douglas emphasized in his dissenting opinion in Ricci, "[t]he road this
litigant is now required to travel to obtain justice is... long and expensive and
available only to those with long purses., 233 If the burden imposed is too
prejudicial, the court is to retain jurisdiction and proceed with the claim.3
Some circuits have struck a court-agency compromise to mitigate the burdens
on the parties. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has stayed the proceedings for a
finite period of time in which the agency was required to act.235 If no
administrative ruling was forthcoming after that time period expired, the district
court was to reassert its jurisdiction. 36
228. Id. at 306.
229. Id. at 306 (quoting the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall).
230. Id. at 306-07 (noting the differences of opinion between Justice Marshall and the
majority of the Court).
231. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing review of mixed questions).
232. See STRAUSS, supra note 15, at 1244 ("[I]nvocation ofprimaryjurisdiction can result
in considerable delay and extra litigation expense . ").
233. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 309 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
234. See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258,269-70 (1993) (stating that the plaintiffs were not
required to seek a determination from the ICC on the reasonableness of the rates before filing
the civil action because the statute of limitations could run before the ICC acted).
235. See Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 1988)




Although a majority of the Court has not explicitly embraced the burden
on the parties as a primary jurisdiction consideration, a number of courts of
appeals have.237 Moreover, sensitivity to the effects of judicial action is an
inherent part of ajudge's equitable authority,238 and it plays a prominent role in
a number of other discretionary decisions a trial judge must make in
supervising litigation.239 Consequently, the burden on the parties is a unique
factor in that it has the potential to become the controlling consideration. On
the one hand, a judge must weigh the burdens of referral, and on the other, he
must evaluate all the benefits embodied in the primary jurisdiction doctrine. If
the judge decides that the burdens outweigh the benefits, that is the end of the
matter, and he is to proceed with the claim. Thus, the mere presence of this
factor may demand trial court discretion regardless of whether the other factors
call for it. In the very least, a decision not to apply the primary jurisdiction
doctrine on the basis of this factor requires deference.
B. Fashioning a Rule of Decision
The second rationale for conferring discretion on the trial court presents
the question of whether the primaryjurisdiction doctrine is well suited to a rule
of decision. In general, when an issue is so unsettled that an appellate court
does not know how to approach the problem, the appellate court will leave its
resolution to the discretion of the trial court.24 ° Sometimes, the absence of a
governing rule is a result of the novelty of the issue. If this is the case,
appellate court deference allows trial courts to develop a pool of common
237. See, e.g., Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Massachusetts Dep't of Envt'l Prot., 163 F.3d 74,
81-82 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that if the potential for delay is too great, the court may choose
not to refer the matter to the agency); Nat'l Commc'ns Ass'n, Inc. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 46
F.3d 220, 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1995) (considering the fair administration of justice as a factor);
Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that a court
may defer only if the benefits of agency review exceed the costs imposed on the parties).
238. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion: The
Michigan Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 609, 609 (1997) ("[E]quity means the power
to do justice in a particular case by exercising discretion to mitigate the rigidity of strict legal
rules.... [It is] the power to adapt the relief to the circumstances of the particular case.").
239. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706-07 (1997) (noting that, as part of its
power to manage the case, the district court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as long as
the delay is not oppressive or overly burdensome); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,
931-32 (1975) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding irreparable
injury in the absence of equitable relief, specifically, a preliminary injunction).
240. See Rosenberg, supra note 160, at 662-63 (explaining that when it is difficult to
formulate a governing rule for the matter in issue, discretion should be conferred on the trial
court).
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experience from which appellate courts might later be able to draw a governing
principle. 241 Alternatively, an issue may arise in such diverse situations that
appellate courts are unable to establish a legal principle suitable to all cases. 42
Again, the appellate court will commit the issue to the discretion of the trial
court.
243
The primary jurisdiction doctrine's long history and developed guidelines
make clear that it does not utterly resist generalization. The mere existence of
factors, however, does not eliminate trial court discretion.244 For example, the
following issues are all committed to a trial court's "guided discretion":
supplemental jurisdiction, award of attorneys' fees, forum non conveniens,
choice of law, preliminary injunctions, and as discussed later, exhaustion of
administrative remedies.245 Some of these examples are discretionary because
they are highly fact dependent, such as forum non conveniens. 246 For others,
the discretion arises from the need to weigh numerous factors with regard to the
particular litigation, as in the application of the exhaustion doctrine.247
Primary jurisdiction is more along the lines of the latter group. The
doctrine is almost one hundred years old, but after all this time the doctrine
remains a bit murky.248 And the circuits continue to cite the Court's language:
241. See id. at 663 (discussing the development of guidelines for decisions concerning
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b)); see also Davis, supra note 161, at 56 ("Some issues
originally thought by the appellate courts to be incapable of governance by general rules of
decision are, after a time and a number of decisions on cases with similar facts, found to be
addressable by such rules.").
242. See Friendly, supra note 155, at 754 (quoting Bouvier's Law Dictionary stating that
discretion arises when no strict rule of law is applicable).
243. See Rosenberg, supra note 160, at 662 ("When the ruling under attack is one that does
not seem to admit of control by a rule that can be formulated or criteria that can be indicated,
prudence and necessity agree that it should be left in the control of the judge at the trial level.").
244. See Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 229 F.R.D. 267,294(2005)
("Review for abuse often includes certain relevant factors-which ones count and whether they
have been weighed right-and individual considerations meaningful only in application to the
specific 'discretionary' context involved.").
245. See id at 295-300 (discussing various decisions that utilize the judge's power to
supervise and control the litigation that are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also
infra Part V.A (discussing the exhaustion doctrine).
246. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981) (noting that each case
turns on its facts and that if the Court laid down a rigid rule governing the trial court's discretion
the doctrine of forum non conveniens would lose the very flexibility that makes it so valuable).
247. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 433 F.3d 332,343 (2d Cir. 2006) (implying
that when exhaustion is not mandated by statute, there is judicial discretion to employ a broad
array of exceptions); see also infra Part V.A (discussing the exhaustion doctrine).
248. See supra Part II.B (noting the differing conceptions of the doctrine currently held by
the circuit courts).
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"No fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine. 2 49 When confronted with a
case not on all fours with controlling precedent, a court is therefore left to
exercise its own judgment. More importantly, the court must weigh the
burdens of referral on the particular litigants, which makes the doctrine less
susceptible to a rule of general applicability.
Examining the two justifications for trial court discretion-the
advantageous position of the trial judge and the feasibility of a rule of
decision-does not provide an obvious answer to the standard of review
problem. Taken as a whole, however, they appear to tip in favor of insulated
review. First, direct contact with the litigation makes the trial judge better able
to weigh the burdens of referral, and as noted above, this is a heavy
consideration in the analysis. Second, the wide array of contexts in which the
doctrine may be raised makes it resilient to a workable rule for all cases. It is
important to emphasize that defining the primary jurisdiction question as a
matter of discretion, and thus applying the abuse of discretion standard, does
not mean that the trial court's decision is untouchable. Defining the question
this way simply means that the reasons for trial court deference are sufficiently
present to depart from de novo review, and that a trial judge's decision should
be weighted accordingly.
250
V Reasoning by Analogy
A. The Exhaustion Doctrine
Primary jurisdiction is "conceptually analogous" to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.251 The Second Circuit has declared
252primary jurisdiction to be simply a "version" of the exhaustion requirement.
This statement is not ill-founded. The doctrines share not only similar
objectives but also similar application. Both are used to determine the timing
of federal-court decisionmaking, and both allocate decisionmaking power
249. United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
250. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text (pointing out that the degree of
deference conferred under an abuse of discretion standard is directly proportional to the strength
of the factors used to apply the standard in the first instance).
251. RIcHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.8 (4th ed.
2004); see also Am. Trucking Assoc. v. ICC, 682 F.2d 487,491 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, like the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, is
concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies
charged with particular regulatory duties.").
252. Goya Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 846 F.2d 848, 851 (2d Cir. 1988).
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253between courts and agencies. The similarity between the doctrines is
particularly useful here because there is an overwhelming consensus regarding
review of the application of exhaustion.254 When exhaustion is not required by
statute, it is within the sound discretion of the court.255
The classic statement of exhaustion from Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp. 256 is that "no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened
253. See United States v. W. Pac. Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 65 (1956) ("The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction thus does more than prescribe the mere procedural time table of the lawsuit.
It is a doctrine allocating the law-making power over certain aspects of commercial relations.");
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144-45 (1992) (noting that exhaustion, a manifestation of
congressional delegation of authority to coordinate branches of government, is one of several
doctrines which govern the timing of federal court decisionmaking).
254. See CHILDRESS, supra note 11, § 14.11 (noting that exhaustion "is almost always
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard").
255. See Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 153-54 (1993) (holding that, with respect to
actions brought under the APA, Congress effectively codified the doctrine of exhaustion in 5
U.S.C. § 704; also holding, however, that exhaustion continues to apply as a matter ofjudicial
discretion in cases not governed by the APA); Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp. v. Dep't of Labor,
118 F.3d 205, 208, 210 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that the decision to require exhaustion was
within the sound judicial discretion of the district court, although the court reviewed the
decision to dismiss the complaint de novo); Zephyr Aviation, LLC v. Dailey, 247 F.3d 565, 570
(5th Cir. 2001) (stating that where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, it is a matter of
judicial discretion, but reviewing the district court's decision to grant 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
motions de novo); Dixie Fuel Co. v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 171 F.3d 1052, 1059 (6th Cir.
1999) (following Darby, the court found the APA to govern the claim and therefore the district
court did not have the discretion to require exhaustion in the absence of a statutory or regulatory
requirement to do so); Powell v. A.T. & T. Commc'ns, Inc., 938 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1991)
(stating that the district court's decision to require exhaustion under ERISA could only be
overturned if it constituted a clear abuse of discretion); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Carter &
Tillery Enter., 133 F.3d 1183, 1187 (9th Cir. 1998) (reviewing the district court's decision to
dismiss for failure to complete the administrative review process for abuse of discretion); EEOC
v. Lutheran Social Servs., 186 F.3d 959, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that absent an
unequivocal statutory requirement, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a matter ofjudicial
discretion).
256. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (holding that the
district court lacked the power to enjoin the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) because
the NLRB had the exclusive authority to prevent unfair labor practices). The union representing
the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation's (BSC) workers filed a complaint with the NLRB that
BSC was engaging in unfair labor practices. Id. at 44. In response, the NLRB notified BSC
that it would hold a full evidentiary hearing regarding the allegations. Id. at 45. On the day it
received this notice, BSC filed suit in district court to enjoin the NLRB from holding the
hearing. Id. at 46. In support of its prayer for an injunction, BSC argued that the operations at
the plant in issue did not affect interstate commerce, that the hearing would be futile, and that
the hearing would inflict irreparable injury. Id. at 47. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that
the district court acted beyond the scope of its power by granting BSC's request and enjoining
the NLRB. Id. The Court reasoned that Congress had vested the NLRB with exclusive power
to prevent unfair labor practices, id. at 48, and that it was for the NLRB to determine whether
the allegations in the complaint implicated interstate commerce. Id. at 49-50. To hold for BSC,
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injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. ' 257 Out
of that statement grew a court-created, prudential rule designed to serve two
primary objectives: protecting administrative authority and promoting judicial
efficiency.258 With regard to the first purpose, the Court stated that "agencies,
not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that
Congress has charged them to administer. '" 259 Placing primary responsibility in
the agency, according to the Court, is especially important when the claim
involves the exercise of administrative discretion or expertise. 260 Note that both
the congressional commitment of authority and the utilization of expertise are
also primary jurisdiction considerations. Frequent disregard for the
administrative process, the Court continued, may undermine the agency's
effectiveness.
2 6 1
The Court has also stated that requiring exhaustion is efficient because
administrative proceedings may moot a judicial controversy or otherwise
provide a useful record for the reviewing court.262 Here, the Court again
emphasizes a primary jurisdiction consideration, the potential benefit to the
court. Where the doctrines appear to differ, albeit slightly, is in purpose:
Primary jurisdiction focuses on maintaining regulatory uniformity, 263 and
264exhaustion focuses on reinforcing agency autonomy.
The application of primaryjurisdiction and exhaustion also employ similar
analytical steps. The Supreme Court stated in McCarthy v. Madigan265 that
the Court declared, would directly contradict congressional intent. Id. at 50. Furthermore, the
NLRB procedures and the availability of judicial review were sufficient to protect BSC's
interests. Id.
257. Id. at50-51.






263. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text (discussing Abilene Cotton-the
source of this uniformity objective).
264. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969) (noting that "notions of
administrative autonomy require that the agency be given a chance to discover and correct its
own errors" and that "deliberate flouting of administrative processes could weaken the
effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures"); see also L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 425 (1965) (stating that the exhaustion
requirement is an expression of executive and administrative autonomy).
265. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992) (holding that exhaustion is not
required when a prisoner seeks only money damages). In McCarthy, the issue before the
Supreme Court was whether an inmate had to exhaust the procedures provided by the Federal
Bureau of Prisons before bringing a Bivens action in federal court solely for money damages.
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"[o]f paramount importance to any exhaustion inquiry is congressional
intent., 266 It further stated, "Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion
is required. ' 267  These statements represent the threshold question in the
exhaustion analysis: Is the issue susceptible to judicial review? If not, the
complaining party must exhaust the administrative procedures and the court is
without jurisdiction to hear the claim.268 This threshold exhaustion question
mirrors the initial primary jurisdiction inquiry.269 If Congress has ousted the
courts ofjurisdiction by the creation of an agency, as it did by creating the ICC
with the Commerce Act, then the court must refer the issue to the agency.27 °
Once jurisdiction has been determined, the next step in the exhaustion
analysis requires federal courts to "balance the interest of the individual in
retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum against countervailing
institutional interests favoring exhaustion., 271 In explaining this process, the
Court stated that the "balancing... is intensely practical., 272 "[A]ttention is
directed to both the nature of the claim presented and the characteristics of the
particular administrative procedure provided., 273 More importantly, the Court
declared that "where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound
judicial discretion governs. '274 Courts and scholars have reasoned that this
discretion inheres in the requirement that a trial court weigh numerous factors
and exceptions in applying the exhaustion doctrine.275
Id. at 141. The Court held that exhaustion was not required. Id. at 149. In this context,
Congress had not mandated exhaustion and McCarthy's interests outweighed the countervailing
institutional interests favoring exhaustion. Id.
266. Id. at 144.
267. Id.
268. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 193 (stating that a primary purpose of the exhaustion
doctrine is to avoid the premature interruption in the administrative process); see also Bangura
v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Where a statute requires a plaintiff to exhaust
his or her administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, federal courts do not have
subject matter jurisdiction to review the plaintiff's claim until the plaintiff has [done so].. ").
269. See supra Part 1V.A (discussing the analytical steps in applying primary jurisdiction).
270. See supra Part II.A (discussing the jurisdictional inquiry in Abilene Cotton).
271. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 144.
275. See CHILDRESS, supra note 11, § 14.11 (listing the factors to be balanced in the
application of the exhaustion doctrine). These factors include:
[C]lear abuse of administrative jurisdiction, presence of a question of law
peculiarly within judicial competence that would be case-dispositive, the futility of
pursuing an administrative remedy .... prior consideration by the agency of the
exact issue under review. .. , the need to develop a record, the need to reflect
agency expertise, conservation of judicial resources, a clear violation of the
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The similarities to the primary jurisdiction doctrine are compelling. For the
second step in the primary jurisdiction analysis, "[n]o fixed formula exists ....
[T]he question is whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present
and whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its application in the particular
litigation."276 Under both doctrines, then, a trial court is required to balance a
number of similar factors, including the need to reflect agency expertise, the need
to conserve judicial resources, the need to develop the record, and the futility of
administrative action.277 More importantly, neither doctrine is to be imposed if
the burdens on the parties are too great.278
Primary jurisdiction and exhaustion are different means to promote the
broad concepts of judicial restraint, efficiency, and deference to administrative
decisionmaking. In fact, they are but two of several paths a court may take when
relinquishing its adjudicatory power to an agency. The doctrines of abstention,
finality, and ripeness also govern the timing of federal court decisionmaking.
279
The conceptual overlap in all of these doctrines demonstrates that there does not
have to be bright lines between them-having a unique purpose or focus is
sufficient.280
The distinctions that can be made between exhaustion and primary
jurisdiction are inadequate to justify differing standards of review. Beginning
with Western Pacific, the Supreme Court has attempted to distinguish the
doctrines. It declared that exhaustion applies "where a claim is cognizable in the
claimant's constitutional or statutory rights, the need to allow the agency to correct
errors, the likelihood of irreparable injury, the likelihood of unusual hardship, and
the fact that administrative proceedings would be void.
Id; see also STEIN, supra note 4, § 49.02 (explaining the most common exceptions to the
doctrine of exhaustion).
276. United States v. W. Pac. Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
277. Compare Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573-74 (1952) (finding
that utilization of administrative expertise was necessary), and Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile
Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 306 (1973) (noting that referral would either moot the controversy or
develop a useful record), and Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406 (1970) (finding primary
jurisdiction inapplicable because the agency lacked the appropriate procedures to address the
petitioners claim), with CHILDRESS, supra note 11, § 14.11 (listing exhaustion factors).
278. Compare Wagner& Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199,201(5th Cir. 1988)
(stating that a court may defer only if the benefits of agency review exceed the costs imposed on
the parties), with CHILDRESS, supra note 11, § 14.11 (listing exhaustion factors, including the
likelihood of irreparable injury and the likelihood of unusual hardship).
279. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140,144 (1992) (noting that exhaustion is among the
closely related doctrines of abstention, finality, and ripeness).
280. See STRAuss, supra note 15, at 1238 (noting that because the doctrines are so closely
related it is helpful to think of exhaustion as focusing on party behavior, finality on agency
behavior, and ripeness on judicial behavior).
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first instance by an administrative agency alone. ' ' 281 The Court continued that
"'primary jurisdiction,' on the other hand, applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts. 2 82 For many cases, this distinction holds true, but the
Court's statement about exhaustion is necessarily false when exhaustion is not
required by statute. In such instances, a trial court may invoke certain established
exceptions to exhaustion and proceed with the claim.283 Furthermore, exhaustion
may be waived by an agency at any time to enable it to seek judicial assistance in
enforcing its orders. 284 Therefore, exhaustion may still apply when the claim is
originally cognizable by both court and agency-and not the agency alone-
which is exactly when primary jurisdiction may apply.
Another means of distinguishing exhaustion and primaryjurisdiction lies in
the remedies available to the court. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Wagner &
Brown deferred to the primary jurisdiction of the FERC.285 But in order to
prevent irreparable harm to the plaintiff, it ordered that judicial proceedings be
stayed for only 180 days.286 If the FERC failed to act within that timeframe, then
the district court was instructed to adjudicate the plaintiff's claim.287 If the court
had instead invoked the doctrine of exhaustion, perhaps focusing on agency
autonomy, it could not have imposed such a time restriction. The court would
have to await administrative action.
The distinctions between exhaustion and primary jurisdiction fail to
undermine the conclusion that the same standard of review should apply primarily
because they do not strike at the heart of the doctrines. That is, the differences do
not speak to the reasons why discretion should be conferred on the trial court.
Most importantly, both doctrines include the fact-sensitive balancing of the
benefits and burdens.
B. The Burford Abstention Doctrine
Like other abstention doctrines, Burford abstention permits a district court to
defer to the jurisdiction of a state adjudicatory body. It is grounded in the concept
281. United States v. W. Pac. Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956).
282. Id. at 63-64.
283. See STEIN, supra note 4, § 49.02 (finding that courts will retain jurisdiction when the
administrative remedy is inadequate, dismissal would result in irreparable injury, the agency is
acting beyond its authority, and further agency proceedings would be futile).
284. Id. § 49.01.
285. Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 1988).
286. Id.
287. Id.
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of judicial restraint and a sense of comity for state law. 88 Specifically, it "is
appropriate when a case involves an unclear state law question of vital local
concern, which must be addressed through a centralized, unified state
administrative system. ' 289 Because Burford abstention involves the referral of a
claim which a state legislature has entrusted to a more knowledgeable tribunal,
it is conceptually analogous to the primary jurisdiction doctrine, 290 and it
presents another argument in support of abuse of discretion review of primary
jurisdiction decisions.291
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,292 the respondent challenged an order of the
Texas Railroad Commission in federal district court, invoking its diversity
jurisdiction. 293 The Commission had granted Burford a permit to drill four oil
wells in a small field in Eastern Texas294 based on an exception.to a regulatory
scheme that would have otherwise prohibited the wells.295 The issue before the
Supreme Court was not whether the permit should have been issued, but
whether the federal district court should have declined to exercise its
jurisdiction.296 The Court held that the state courts should be given the first
opportunity to review claims involving the Texas oil and gas rationing
288. See R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (stating that abstention
doctrines contribute to a "harmonious relationship" between state and federal authority);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (noting that an underlying reason for judicial
restraint is respect for state functions).
289. MooRE, supra note 10, § 122.041].
290. See Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1265-66 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (noting
that both primary jurisdiction and Burford abstention are concerned with protecting
administrative process from judicial interference and stating that "[i]n the context of this case,
Burford abstention and primary jurisdiction are different labels for the same thing").
291. See Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2004) (reviewing
Burford abstention decisions for abuse of discretion); Riley v. Simmons, 45 F.3d 764, 770 (3d
Cir. 1995) (reviewing the decision to abstain for abuse of discretion, but reviewing the district
court's legal analysis de novo); Wilson v. Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 8 F.3d 311, 313 (5th
Cir. 1993) (reviewing decision to abstain for abuse of discretion); Int'l Coll. of Surgeons v. City
of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir. 1998) (reviewing a district court's decision to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion); City of Tucson v. U.S. West Commc'ns,
Inc., 284 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (reviewing the decision to abstain for abuse of
discretion when the requirements for abstention are present); Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199
F.3d 1260, 1265 (11 th Cir. 2000) (reviewing the decision to abstain for abuse of discretion).
292. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (holding that, given the nature ofthe
state regulatory scheme involved, the district court abused its discretion by failing to abstain
from exercising its jurisdiction).
293. Id. at 317.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 324.
296. Id. at 318.
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297
programs. In support of its holding, the Court noted that the Texas
legislature had vested the power to review the orders of the Commission in the
courts of a single county.298 The rationale behind this decision, according to
the Texas courts, was to prevent "interminable confusion. ' 299 The Court also
pointed out that confining review of the Commission's actions to particular
state courts allowed those courts to develop "specialized knowledge., 300 By
emphasizing consistent treatment of a regulatory scheme and the unique
knowledge of the state court, the Supreme Court highlights the parallels
between Burford abstention and primary jurisdiction. Later cases draw the two
doctrines even closer together.
In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City ofNew Orleans,
30 1
the Court more explicitly articulated the uniformity objective of Burford
abstention. Burford abstention, the Court declared, is not required simply
because a complex state regulatory scheme exists.30 2 Rather, the doctrine is
intended to prevent disruption in the State's efforts "to ensure uniformity in the
treatment of an essentially local problem. 30 3 In addition, as lower courts have
applied this abstention doctrine, it has been expanded to include not only
deference to state courts, but to state administrative agencies as well.3°
297. Burford, 319 U.S. at 332.
298. Id. at 326.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 327.
301. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350
(1989) (holding that the lower court abused its discretion by invoking Burford abstention when
the claim turned on a matter of preemption). New Orleans Public Service (NOPSI) is a
producer and retailer of electricity that supplies power to the City of New Orleans. Id. at 353.
NOPSI entered into an agreement with other power companies to share the cost of building and
operating a nuclear reactor, Grand Gulf 1. Id. at 353-54. After completion of the reactor, the
FERC conducted an investigation to determine the reasonable allocation of Grand Gulf's costs
and output. Id. at 354. The FERC concluded that NOPSI was responsible for 17% of Grand
Gulf's costs. Id. NOPSI then sought permission from the New Orleans City Council to raise its
rates in order to cover the newly imposed expenses. Id. at 355. Ultimately, the City Council
decided to prevent NOPSI from recovering $135 million of its Grand Gulf costs. Id. at 356.
NOPSI then filed suit in federal court asserting that the Council's rate order was preempted by
federal law. Id. at 357. The district court abstained from deciding the issue, leaving review of
the Council's order to the Louisiana courts. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that
Burford abstention was inapplicable because the preemption inquiry would not intrude into state
government processes or undermine the State's ability to maintain uniformity. Id. at 363.
302. Id. at 362.
303. Id. (citations omitted).
304. See MOORE, supra note 10, § 122.04[3] (stating that "Burford abstention... defers to
a state administrative agency or state procedures for judicial review of agency action").
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Consequently, Burford abstention has come to resemble primary jurisdiction
both in purpose and in procedure.
The match between the doctrines, however, is inexact. On a fundamental
level, abstention doctrines are motivated out of respect for federalism and state
autonomy. Such concerns are wholly irrelevant to primary jurisdiction.
30 5
Moreover, when a federal court abstains and refers a case to the state court or
agency under Burford, the court has in effect disposed of the case
permanently. 30 6 Primary jurisdiction--or even exhaustion for that matter-
presupposes that the federal courts may continue to be involved.30 7
The Eleventh Circuit has also pointed out key distinctions between
308primary jurisdiction and Burford abstention. First, as conceived in primary
jurisdiction, uniformity is a national concept. Federal courts defer to federal
agencies in order to ensure uniform policies and therefore uniform results.30 9 In
contrast, when an issue falls within the authority of a state court or agency, the
same scope of uniformity is "neither expected nor prized. '3 10  Second, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that the very existence of a federal agency with
adjudicatory responsibilities suggests that Congress intended to limit the power
of the federal courts. When a state legislature creates state agencies, the
same conclusion with regard to federal courts is untenable.
31 2
Admittedly, the distinctions presented by the Eleventh Circuit provide a
persuasive argument that primary jurisdiction should not be employed as a
means of referring an issue to a state agency, 31 3 but not all courts have adopted
305. See Taffet v. S. Co., 930 F.2d 847, 854 (11th Cit. 1991) (noting that primary
jurisdiction involves deference by a federal court to a federal agency entrusted to implement a
federal regulatory scheme).
306. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 714 (1996) (noting that when a
court invokes Burford abstention, it retains nothing of the matter on the federal court's docket);
Riley v. Simmons, 45 F.3d 764, 771 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the effect of Burford abstention
is not to postpone federal court review but to prevent it entirely).
307. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (stating that primary jurisdiction allows
courts to stay, rather than dismiss, proceedings pending administrative action); STRAUSS, supra
note 15, at 1244 (noting that disputes referred to an agency under primary jurisdiction usually
find their way back to the court for further review).
308. See Taffet v. S. Co., 930 F.2d 847, 854 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (discussing primary
jurisdiction as applied to state regulatory agencies); see also County of Suffolk v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1309-11 (2d Cir. 1990) (reasoning that primary jurisdiction does
not provide an appropriate means of deferring to state agencies).




313. See supra note 308 (citing sources that discuss the validity of primary jurisdiction
referrals to state agencies).
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this position.314 Primary jurisdiction and Burford abstention are still seen to
have substantial common ground.315 Furthermore, the differences do not
undermine the need for trial court discretion in applying the doctrines. Each
doctrine has contextual considerations. That is, if ajudge finds that application
to the particular case will not further the objectives of the doctrine, she is free to
retain jurisdiction of the claim. Thus, the differences discussed above are not
meaningful to the appropriate standard of review.
VI. Conclusion
Most of the confusion surrounding the primary jurisdiction doctrine results
from the manner in which the Court used the phrase, "primary jurisdiction," in
Abilene Cotton and Merchants Elevator. In the context of those early cases, the
Court actually meant jurisdiction when it said "jurisdiction." But over the
course of the twentieth century, primary jurisdiction evolved into a doctrine
that-for better or worse-has departed from the plain implication of its
name.316 Today, primary jurisdiction does not define the actual scope of
authority of courts or agencies.31 7 Rather, it allows a court to refrain from
exercising its authority to further the objectives that the doctrine has now come
to represent. Primary jurisdiction, as currently conceived, is a means of
deciding which tribunal is the more advantageous decisionmaker when the
issue could be presented to either.318
The evolution of the doctrine has broadened its applicability. Trial courts
are now able to refer issues to administrative decision makers in a greater
number of contexts because the doctrine is no longer limited to those situations
in which the court is actually divested of its jurisdiction. It is raised in both
314. See PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating
that primary jurisdiction may be applicable "in cases in which a state has a formal administrative
proceeding in progress that the citizen's suit would disrupt"); Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199
F.3d 1260, 1265 n. 11 (11 th Cir. 2000) (leaving unaddressed whether primaryjurisdiction could
justify deference in favor of a state agency).
315. Boyes, 199 F.3d at 1265-66 (stating that primaryjurisdiction and Burford abstention
are different labels for the same thing).
316. See In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1162 (3d Cir.
1993) ("[T]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction, despite what the term may imply, does not speak
to the jurisdictional power ofthe federal courts.").
317. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 304 (1973) (refusing to decide
the jurisdictional question, yet applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine).
318. See PIERCE, supra note 251, § 5.8 (noting that primary jurisdiction is a "pragmatic
evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of allowing the agency to resolve an issue in the
first instance").
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criminal and civil suits, 319 and it can be applied to matters of pure statutory
interpretation.320 This expansion of the doctrine is perfectly consistent with the
Supreme Court's increased deference to agencies in general.321 Particularly
since Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,322 deference to
administrative authority via primaryjurisdiction is appropriate in more cases.323
Consequently, the doctrine is raised more often by litigants and courts, 324 and
defining the standard of review is increasingly important to the proper review
of these decisions.
The standard of review debate boils down to a choice between some-
even minimal--deference to the trial court and none at all.325  The initial
response, especially to the name of the doctrine, may be to accord no
326deference. But after more thorough analysis, the better answer is to provide
319. See, e.g., United States v. Culliton, 328 F.3d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003) (addressing
the criminal defendant's argument regarding primary jurisdiction); ASAP Paging, Inc. v.
CenturyTel of San Marcos Inc., 137 Fed. Appx. 694,697 (5th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion)
(discussing primary jurisdiction as it related to a claim that an order of the Texas Public Utility
Commission was preempted by federal law).
320. See Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 576 (1952) (referring the case
to the Federal Maritime Board for a determination of the scope of the Shipping Act of 1916);
see also Jaffe, supra note 23, at 1049 (noting that Far East Conference extended the primary
jurisdiction doctrine to include referral of questions of law).
321. See Davis, supra note 161, at 62-64 (discussing a series of cases following Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council that showed increased deference to agencies'
statutory interpretation).
322. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (holding that a reasonable administrative interpretation of ambiguous statutory language
is entitled to judicial deference). In Chevron, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether
the EPA had defined "stationary source" based on a reasonable construction of the Clean Air
Act. Id. at 839-40. The Court reasoned that when a statute is silent or ambiguous as to the
specific issue, Congress has implicitly delegated authority to the agency, id. at 843-44, and the
court is not free to impose its own interpretation. Id. at 844. Rather, the only question on
appeal was whether the agency's interpretation was permissible. Id. at 843. The Court held that
the EPA's use of the term was a reasonable policy choice. Id. at 845.
323. See Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Massachusetts Dep't of Envt'l Prot., 163 F.3d 74, 81
(1st Cir. 1998) (pointing out that primary jurisdiction referral is appropriate in those situations
where the court would defer to the agency under Chevron); United States v. Haun, 124 F.3d
745, 750 n.5 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that, because the statute at issue is unambiguous, Chevron
does not factor into the analysis and a primary jurisdiction referral is inappropriate); see also
STRAuss, supra note 15, at 1244 (finding that "courts have discerned new impetus for [the]
invocation of primary jurisdiction in Chevron v. NRDC").
324. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644,674 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (stating that a court can raise the primary jurisdiction doctrine on its own motion).
325. See supra Part III.A (noting that de novo review allows the appellate court to conduct
its own analysis without any deference to the trial court's decision).
326. See MOORE, supra note 10, § 206.08 (finding that the standard of review is de novo
for jurisdictional issues).
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trial judges at least some discretion in applying the doctrine. First, more
appellate courts have adopted the abuse of discretion standard once they
address the issue directly, although they provide little rationale as to why.
327
Second, deconstructing the primary jurisdiction doctrine suggests that
discretion ought to be conferred.328 In particular, the last factor of the
analysis-the burden of referral on the parties-calls for trial court
discretion. 329 This is especially true when a trial judge refuses to apply the
doctrine in order to avoid excessive burdens. In addition, the number of
scenarios in which the doctrine may now be raised makes it resistant to a rule of
decision applicable to all cases. Without precedent on point, a trial court is
required to exercise its own judgment.330
Third, and perhaps most persuasively, the primaryjurisdiction, exhaustion,
and Burford abstention doctrines are remarkably alike, and the latter two are
decisively committed to the discretion of the trial court.33' Although there are
differences among the doctrines, the differences are immaterial to the standard
of review issue. Each of the three doctrines can be characterized as a form of
judicial abstention because their application brings about the same basic result.
Consequently, primary jurisdiction should share the same standard of review.332
As discussed earlier, the abuse of discretion standard carries a wide range
of deference.333 Some decisions are practically irreversible, while others are
more closely scrutinized.334 The degree of deference is generally a matter of
how heavily the decision is guided by legal standards. Primary jurisdiction has
established factors and a substantial amount of case law. Therefore, applying
the abuse of discretion standard does not set a trial judge adrift at sea.335 Her
327. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the circuits that review for an abuse of discretion).
328. See supra Part IV (finding that the rationales for trial court discretion weigh in favor
of trial court discretion).
329. See supra Part IV.A.4 (describing the uniqueness of this factor to command appellate
court deference).
330. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the inability to fashion a rule of decision as a
rationale for trial court discretion).
331. See supra Part V (comparing primary jurisdiction to exhaustion and Burford
abstention, both of which are reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
332. See MooRE, supra note 10, § 122.08[2] (finding that most appellate courts review all
abstention decisions for an abuse of discretion).
333. See supra Part III.B (explaining the abuse of discretion standard).
334. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text (explaining the varying treatment of
decisions under the abuse of discretion standard).
335. See Friendly, supra note 155, at 763 (quoting Delno v. Mkt. St. Ry. Co., 124 F.2d
965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942)). Judge Friendly approvingly recites that, at one end of the spectrum,
discretion may be defined as follows:
Discretion, in this sense, is abused when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or
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decision is still guided by the doctrine itself, i.e. application to the litigation
must further the objectives the doctrine embodies.336 Moreover, if the trial
judge commits legal error while exercising her discretion, e.g. misinterprets
controlling precedent, she has by definition abused her discretion. 337 In sum, a
trial judge ought to be accorded enough leeway to fine tune the analysis to the
case at hand, while appellate judges ought to be free to refine and develop the
legal doctrine.3 38 Because of its flexibility, the abuse of discretion standard
achieves both of these goals.
unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where
no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable
men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it
cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.
Id.
336. See United States v. W. Pac. Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956) (providing general
guidelines for the application of the doctrine).
337. See MOORE, supra note 10, § 206.05[1] ("Abuse of discretion is found if the district
court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, upon an errant conclusion of law,
or upon improper application of law to the facts.").
338. See Friendly, supra note 155, at 768 (noting the benefits of developing generally
applicable rules while allowing the trial court to depart when the circumstances require).

